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Abstract 
The main objective of this contribution is to test whether university patents share common 
determinants with university publications at regional level. We build some university 
production functions with 1,519 patents and 180,239 publications for the 17 Spanish 
autonomous regions (NUTS-2) in a time span of 14 years (1988-2001). We use some 
econometric models to estimate their determinants. Our results suggest that there is little 
scope for regional policy to compensate the production of patents vs. publications through 
different university or joint research institutional settings. On the contrary, while patents are 
more reactive to expenditure on R&D, publications are more responsive to the number of 
researchers, so the sustained promotion of both will make it compatible for regions their joint 
production. However, standing out in the generation of both outputs requires costly 
investment in various inputs. 
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Resumen 
El principal objetivo de esta contribución es comprobar si las patentes universitarias 
comparten determinantes con las publicaciones universitarias a nivel regional. Se ha 
generado unas funciones de producción con 1,519 patentes y 180,239 publicaciones para 
las 17 comunidades autónomas españolas, contemplando un periodo temporal de 14 años 
(1988-2001). Se ha utilizado algunos modelos econométricos para estimar sus 
determinantes. Los resultados obtenidos sugieren que la política regional posee un alcance 
limitado para compensar la producción de patentes con la de publicaciones a través de 
diferentes contextos universitarios o de centros mixtos. Por el contrario, mientras que las 
patentes se muestran más reactivas a los gastos de I+D, las publicaciones parecen ser más 
sensibles al número de investigadores, por lo que la promoción sostenida de ambos 
recursos hará compatible la producción conjunta de patentes y publicaciones. A su vez, esto 
implica que destacar en la generación de ambos tipos de resultado requiere costosas 
inversiones en diversos recursos 
Palabras clave: Patentes universitarias, publicaciones universitarias, producción científica, 
regiones 
1. Introduction 
The rise of university patents has been a common trend for most developed countries during 
the last thirty years1. Some theoretical approaches to the relation between university science 
                                                 
1 We will use this term to refer to patents applied for by universities. On patents with university 
inventors applied for by other institutions, see Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch [34], Meyer [32], 
Calderini et al. [11] and Azagra et al. [4]. 
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and industrial innovation provide some grounds to support these views. For Clark ([15]: p. 7), 
“entrepreneurial universities learn faster than non-entrepreneurial counterparts that money 
from many sources enhances the opportunity to make significant moves without waiting for 
systemwide enactments that come slowly, with standardizing rules attached”. For supporters 
of the Triple Helix approach, enhanced efforts by universities to be commercially relevant are 
a natural outcome of the changing role that society requires from them, more aimed at 
providing direct contributions to economic development (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, [23]). 
Other voices have been more critical. Feller [24] foresaw an “erosion of the singular position 
of universities in US”, whose traditional independence of market incentives committed them 
to an efficient supply of scientific and technological knowledge. Moreover, he found “little 
reason to expect that a substantial reallocation of faculty effort will generate appreciable net 
revenues for other than a select number of universities”. The economics of science approach 
(Dasgupta and David [20]) theoretically justified these views by pointing to the substitutive 
effects between R&D leading to patents, and other research which provides less tangible but 
wider benefits.  
These conflicting views make university patents a relevant topic for policy making. Our main 
interest is to focus the debates in a regional context. The region is a crucial unit of 
observation for its capacity to implement science and technology policies and embed an 
idiosyncratic culture (Cooke [16]). Hence, an immediate question is: do we confirm the 
common empirical findings on university patents of studies at sub-regional level when we 
analyse the regional level, e.g. regarding their relation to R&D expenditure? 
Besides, the use of regions may provide useful insights into other issues. For instance, we 
may wonder whether it would make sense for regions to choose strategically among different 
university and joint research structures to increase the number of university patents. Overall, 
our target question is: do regions have any scope to influence the generation of university 
patents through their academic structure? 
Moreover, the Triple Helix approach defends that the differences between basic and applied 
research are eventually blurring in growing fields of science with spontaneous industrial 
application. Therefore, it is natural that most productive faculty generate their traditional 
output, publications, but also patents (Etzkowitz [22]). This view takes distance from the 
concern that university patents are not a relevant contribution to innovation, since the efforts 
to conduct research leading to patents may distort the resources devoted to other more 
useful research (Pavitt [40]). In particular, we wonder where there might be a trade-off 
between R&D or other inputs leading to patents and publications. A constructive balance of 
inputs leading to both outputs may be important for a well working regional innovation 
system. Summing up: do the same forces drive university patents and publications? 
The rest of this paper follows the traditional structure to find some answers. Section 2 
presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data used to 
expand our knowledge. Section 4 gives the results. Section 5 reaches some conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. University patents and research productivity 
2.1.1. What is their relation at sub-regional level? 
Several studies apply econometric techniques to estimate the relation between university 
patents and different explanatory variables. The first six (Foltz et al. [26]; [27]; Carlsson and 
Fridh [13]; Payne and Siow [41]; Coupé [17]; Baldini et al. [6]) use universities as a unit of 
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observation, five in the US case and one in the Italian case. Two of them refer to the 
department or laboratory level of single European universities (Azagra et al. [3], [4]). A final 
study uses individuals as the unit of observation, from two MIT departments (Agrawal and 
Henderson [2])2.  
The most frequent determinant included is R&D expenditure. Carlsson and Fridh [13] find a 
significant positive impact of aggregate R&D on the number of disclosures. Payne and Siow 
[41] and Coupé [17] conclude that the returns of federally funded R&D to patents are 
decreasing. Foltz et al. [26] find the sum of federal and state funding positive and significant 
for all university patents but not significant for agricultural biotechnology university patents. 
Foltz et al. [27] find that state funding has a positive, significant, influence on agricultural 
biotechnology university patents while federal funding has not. Azagra et al. [3] find more 
costly, long-term-oriented, public funds significant, but not less costly, short-term-oriented 
ones. Azagra et al. [4] find regional public funds significant. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the amount of university R&D funds, the more likely it is that 
universities will generate patents. 
A second usual determinant of university patents is size. Foltz et al. [27] and Payne and 
Siow [41] do not find the number of faculty significant but Coupé [17] does. Azagra et al. [3] 
do not find it significant but Azagra et al. [4] do. Baldini et al. [6] do not always find significant 
the effect of budget transfer from central government, taken as a proxy for size rather than 
for R&D resources. Overall, the evidence is not conclusive. We will state the following 
hypothesis with the expectation of a positive sign: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the number of university researchers, the more likely it is that 
universities will generate patents. 
Other determinants are external forces that grow as time goes by.3 A trend variable may 
capture them. Coupé [17], Azagra et al. [3] and Baldini et al. [6] find this trend positive and 
significant but Azagra et al. [4] do not. The explanation may be in the national features of the 
following forces: 
• Strength of technology transfer offices (TTO): Foltz et al. [26] find that the number of 
employees of the TTO matters positively and significantly. In turn, Foltz et al. [27] find 
that this measure is not significant, while a measure of the quality of the TTO is positive 
and significant. Coupé [17] includes a dummy variable indicating the year of 
establishment of the TTO at the university, finding a positive and significant influence. 
The same happens to Carlsson and Fridh [13] with the number of disclosures, on which 
the number of patent applications depends. They also find the influence of the number of 
TTO employees significant and positive. Azagra et al. [3] find this too. 
• University R&D spillovers: Coupé [17] includes a measure of aggregate R&D of other 
universities and he finds its impact positive and significant. Azagra et al. [3] reach the 
same result. 
                                                 
2 We should also mention other studies where the dependent variable is not patents but something 
related. Thursby and Kemp [45] explain whether universities are efficient or not for commercial 
activities, patenting included. Siegel et al. [43] analyse productivity of TTO, measured through the 
number of licenses and their revenue. Bercovitz and Feldman [7] study the determinants of having 
filed a disclosure between 1997 and 1999.  
3 This is not to say that there are no more internal determinants of university patenting. Foltz et al [27] 
and Coupé [17] include a measure of faculty quality (average wage). Foltz et al. [27] and Baldini et al. 
[6] include a measure of patenting experience. 
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• Legal framework: Coupé [17] uses a dummy variable to measure the legal change 
represented by the Bayh-Dole Act, without a significant effect. Something similar occurs 
to Azagra et al. [3] with a dummy for an internal legal change that took place in their case 
study. However, Baldini et al. [6] find that the adoption of an internal regulation is 
significant. 
Consequently, this is the hypothesis we want to test: 
Hypothesis 3. Over time, external forces (e.g. strength of TTO, university R&D spillovers, 
legal framework) make the number of university patents increase. 
2.1.2. Do regions have any scope to influence the generation of university patents 
through their academic structure? 
One may distinguish among types of universities according to the historical period of their 
creation, since each period may foster different missions and organisational structures, e.g. 
medieval, contemporary and post-World War II universities (Geuna [28]). One may think of 
different technical orientations (polytechnics and other) or regimes of ownership (public or 
private), etc. 
These differences may be relevant for the production of university patents. Coupé [17] 
makes a distinction between public and private universities but he does not find significant 
differences. Foltz et al. [26] find that the presence of agricultural schools and the importance 
of agriculture in the local economy help to explain the production of agricultural 
biotechnology university patents. Baldini et al. [6] do not find evidence that the presence of a 
medical school affects patenting. In addition, Mowery and Sampat [35] show that, according 
to the prevailing incentives at a particular time, public or private universities will change their 
interest in patenting. In any case, regions may contain different numbers and types of 
universities, because of their own historical trajectory and decision-making. This motivates 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. University structure matters: the composition of universities according to their 
age, technical orientation or regime of ownership will influence the generation of patents. 
The existence of joint research centres between universities and public research 
organisations (e.g. CNRS in France, CNR in Italy, CSIC in Spain) implies access to larger 
capital and human infrastructure in order to obtain newer and more important discoveries. 
Hence, for universities, having joint research centres with public organisations may increase 
their resources. Besides, these organisations may have cultural and functional features that 
lead to higher protection by means of patents, e.g. their preference for research leading to 
practical applications as compared to universities (Cesaroni and Piccalugga [14]) or the lack 
of teaching responsibilities. Azagra et al. [3] show that the presence of a joint research centre 
at a university increases its propensity to patent. For these reasons, we present the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. Joint research structure matters: the higher the number of joint research 
centres between universities and other public research organisations, the more likely it will 
be that universities generate patents. 
2.2. University patents and university publications: do the same inputs produce both 
outputs? 
The literature has long studied the idea that certain personal characteristics matter in the 
process of scientific production, e.g. age or gender (Stephan [44]; Xie and Shauman [47]). 
The analysis at institutional level is most recent but it is enough to show some evidence that 
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there exists a relation between university R&D and university publications (Adams and 
Griliches [1]; Crespi and Geuna [19]). At laboratory level, the negative effects of age 
structure and size and the inconclusive effect of spatial agglomeration have also been tested 
(Bonaccorsi and Daraio [8], [9]). 
The explained variable has always been the count of publications, sometimes weighted by 
the number of citations. The analysis of university patents have been the focus of studies like 
those in section 2.1.1. However, both traditions think in terms of common determinants, e.g. 
R&D or size. Payne and Siow [41] actually explain university publications and patents as a 
function of these. They find that each additional one million dollars in federal funding 
produces 11 articles and 0.2 patents. Size, measured through number of faculty, does not 
have a significant impact on any outputs. 
Another econometric approach to the relation between university publications and patents 
has been to estimate the former as a function of the latter, and/or vice versa, at individual or 
laboratory level. Thus, Agrawal and Henderson [2] show that the number of papers (patents) 
does not depend on the number of current and lagged patents (papers)4. In turn, Carayol and 
Matt [12] regress average publication performance on number of patent applications and find 
a positive relation. In any case, this approach are arguable, it shows no negative association 
between university publications and patents. Breschi et al. [10] overcome arguable  
assumptions on the direction of causality by using a hazard function, and they find a positive 
relation.5 
No attempts have been made to study this issue at regional level. On the former basis, we 
start by formulating an intuitive hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6. The determinants of university patents and university publications are 
coincident. 
3. Methodology and data 
The aim of the present section is to estimate some econometric models on the 
determinants of university patents and publications and test the hypotheses raised.  
The sample contains data about Spain, a member country of the European Union (EU). 
According to OECD [37], Gross Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) as a 
percentage of GDP grew from 0.41 in 1981 to 0.97 in 2001, the first year to reach 50% of the 
EU average. GERD performed by the Business Enterprise sector rose from 45.5% to 54.3% 
in the same period, around 0.2 times lower than the EU average in the last decade. In turn, 
GERD performed by the Higher Education sector rose from 22.9% to 29.4% and was around 
0.4 times higher than the EU average. However, Higher Education Expenditure on Research 
and Development (HERD) as a percentage of GDP, which augmented from 0.09 to 0.28, has 
only reached 70% of the EU average in 2000. Hence, Spanish universities perform more 
R&D activities than Spanish firms do in relative terms, but still little compared to EU 
universities. This is representative of peripheral countries of the EU as well as of 
economically developed countries with some technological weaknesses. Nevertheless, 
HERD financed by industry has increased from 1.2% in 1984 to 6.9% in 2000, fluctuating 
widely above the EU average from 1988, maybe due to statistical reasons (17% more in 
2000). In any case, it seems that Spanish universities follow the general trend of increased 
industrial funding, common to most Western economies. 
                                                 
4 However, they find some complementarities between patenting impact and publishing impact. 
5 Biliometrics also suggest a positive association between publishing and patenting, at least in a 
science-based technology (Meyer, [33]). 
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We collected data for 14 years and the 17 Spanish autonomous regions. The resulting 
database is therefore a 238-observation panel.6 
3.1. Dependent variables and methods of estimation 
A first set of data comprise Spanish university patents in the period 1988-2001. We include 
applications and grants, because both sorts of documents integrate the state of the art and 
can be a reference for future patents. Data come from the CIBEPAT database of the Spanish 
Patent and Trademark Office (OEPM).  
Our period of observation begins from 1988 because data for some independent variables 
start in 1987 and we assume, at least, a one year lag with them (see next sub-section). It is a 
good starting date in that the European Patent Agreement came into force in Spain in 1986 
and the PCT in 1989. The last year of the sample is 2001 because of the delay of updating. 
We made a query to identify all patents with at least one Spanish university among the 
applicants. As we may see in Table 1, we found 1,479 “real” patents. We assigned patents to 
regions according to the main site of the university. When more than one university appeared 
in the list of applicants, we chose to assign one patent per university. This way, we 
generated 1,519 “counted” patents. Therefore, this method does not produce a high 
distortion in the data, only 2.7%. Another reading of this is that there is little collaboration 
between Spanish universities to get protection for technological discoveries. 
Table 1 also shows that most patent documents are national patents (94.5% of real and 
counted patents) while international patents represent a low percentage (5.5% of real and 
counted patents) of all the patents maybe because of their higher costs and requirements. 
In addition, while most national patents are grants (81.6%), most international patents are 
applications (75.9%) due to the delay of the granting process. 
Real patents Counted patents 
 
Total Applied patents Granted Patents Total 
National patents 1398 264 1172 1436 
International patents 81 63 20 83 
European patents 10 7 3 10 
PCT patents 71 56 17 73 
TOTAL 1479 327 1192 1519 
Table 1. Distribution of real and counted patents by route of patenting 
Source: OEPM: Cibepat and own elaboration. 
Considering all this, we defined the next variables for the estimations: 
• Natpat: number of Spanish university counted patents applied for through the national 
route. 
• Natgrant: number of Spanish university counted patents granted through the national 
route. 
                                                 
6 There have been some studies on university patents in Spain, not published in English. They tend to 
assume that university patents are positive and the main question is how to enhance their 
generation. (Fernández de Córdoba, [25]; Durán, [21]; Coronado et al., [18]). 
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• Intpat: number of Spanish university counted patents applied for through an international 
route, i.e. the sum of both European and PCT patents. We considered it appropriate to 
add together these two sets of patents because of the small number of patents in each 
one. 
Our framework of analysis is the knowledge production function introduced by Griliches 
[30]. In order to find the adequate estimation technique, we must take into account that 
patents are typical count data. The baseline model is the Poisson regression model (PRM), 
which holds under the assumption of equidispersion. An extension of the PRM is the 
Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), which relaxes this assumption. However, one 
might argue that different reasons cause the presence of zeros. Zero-inflated count models 
respond to this failure. 
Because of the small number of international patents, we followed an alternative approach 
by creating the following variable: 
• Intpat2: having at least one university counted patent, applied for through an international 
route. It is a transformation of intpat, leaving data with zeros as they were originally and 
transforming all the rest into ones. 
Following this alternative approach, a more appropriate technique of estimation for intpat2 
is the Probit Model.  
A second set of data comprise Spanish university publications, namely, those included in 
the Web of Science databases of Thomson Scientific-ISI during the period 1988-2001. Arts 
and Humanities Citation Index, Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation index are 
multidisciplinary databases that cover mainstream international scientific journals. 
In order to search for the Spanish university publications, all records including a Spanish 
university in the address field were retrieved. Moreover, the query included the variants 
corresponding to each Spanish university’s name to ensure the exhaustiveness in the 
retrieving process. 
Whole counting scheme is used, that is to say, each “real” publication out of 159,015 has 
been assigned in full to all unique institution appearing in the address field (Okubo [38]). A 
consequence of this counting method is the larger number of “counted” publications, 180,239 
in total, due to the collaboration between Spanish universities. The rate of duplication is 
therefore 13.3%, higher than in the case of patents, which means that scientific collaboration 
is a more frequent practice than technological cooperation among universities. 
All types of documents were taken into account (articles, reviews, editorials, letters, etc.). 
Finally, we use this variable: 
• Lpub: logarithm of the number of Spanish university counted international publications in 
the AHCI, SCI and SSCI databases.  
We employed models for panel data to do the estimations.  
3.2. Independent variables and selection technique 
All the independent variables in the regression model are lagged one year in order to 
prevent endogeneity as much as possible. A first set of data comes from the National 
Statistics Institute (INE), specifically from R&D activities statistics. Regionalisation of these 
data started in 1987, which explains the beginning of our period of observation: 
• Lherd: logarithm of the real value of university R&D expenditure (in thousand Euro), using 
the GDP deflator. 
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• Lfte: logarithm of the number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) researchers. 
• We also introduce the following variable: 
• Trend: year of the patent application. 
Aspects concerning university structure come from the Universia.es portal7: 
• Univst1: a vector of three variables classifying universities according to their regime of 
ownership and being a polytechnic. Ppub is the proportion of public, non-polytechnic 
universities, ppol the proportion of public, polytechnic universities and ppriv the proportion 
of private universities. We use ppub as the benchmark. 
• Univst2: a vector of four variables classifying universities according to epoch of creation, 
following Geuna [28] and Rodríguez-San Pedro [42]: pmed is the proportion of medieval 
universities (up to 1475), pmod of modern universities (up to 1800), pcont of 
contemporary universities (up to 1943) and prec of recent universities. Pmed is the 
benchmark. 
Since univst1 and univst2 overlap, we use them alternatively for the estimations. 
From the Spanish High Council for Scientific Research’s (CSIC) reports, we build the 
variables regarding other public research infrastructure: 
• Pjoi: ratio of number of university-CSIC joint research centres to number of universities. 
Although not to test any hypothesis, it is important to control for regional capacity and thus 
we built the following variable from INE: 
• Lpop: logarithm of population size. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables. The average R&D 
expenditure was 34.3 million euros per region and year while the average number of FTE-
researchers was 1385. There were around three universities per region and year: more than 
84% were public, around 12% were private and less than 4% were polytechnics. According 
to their time of creation, there were 3% medieval, 19% modern, 15% contemporary and 63% 
recent universities. For joint research centres there were more than one per region and year 
while their proportion was approximately 37%, i.e. more than one third of universities had 
one joint research centre on average. Finally, the average region had a population of 2.3 
million people. 
When we run the regressions, we follow this selection strategy: we start by choosing 
between Poisson, negative binomial and zero inflated models. Once the best technique has 
been selected, we delete the non-significant variable the coefficient of which has the worst t-
value8. We estimate a reduced model without the deleted variable. We make a likelihood 
ratio test against the original model. If the test shows preference for the reduced model, we 
repeat the previous steps. If there are no non-significant variables to delete, we accept the 
reduced model9. 
 
                                                 
7 http://www.universia.es. 
8 In the case of groups of dummies (univst1, univst2), we test their joint significance. 
9 In a similar fashion we carried out the selection procedure for the probit and panel data models. 
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Herd 34341.6 39254 1.57601 4.45536 0 157684 
Fte 1385.13 1615.24 1.75914 5.48994 0 7802 
Ppub 0.845971 0.214805 -0.959798 2.39631 0.333333 1 
Ppol 0.0346885 0.0812606 2.41663 7.87373 0 0.333333 
Ppriv 0.119341 0.19732 1.31779 3.14932 0 0.666667 
Pmed 0.033691 0.106962 3.39215 13.6024 0 0.5 
Pmod 0.185578 0.333386 1.78634 4.67427 0 1 
Pcont 0.153797 0.255156 1.7164 5.37017 0 1 
Prec 0.626934 0.346687 -0.658058 2.24702 0 1 
Pjoi 0.367389 0.547863 1.95464 7.62337 0 3 
Pop 2329184.71 2005968.62 1.16923 3.1667 260964 7340052 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of independent variables10. N=238. 
4. Results 
We show the final reduced models in Table 3. For count data models negative binomial 
estimations were always preferred to Poisson and zero inflated negative binomial ones. For 
the OLS estimation, a fixed effects model with regional dummies was preferred to a random 
effects model and to the inclusion of time dummies. 
We start with Columns 1 to 4, referred to patents. There is empirical evidence that 
Hypothesis 1 is valid, since the variable of R&D expenditure indicates a significant positive 
relation with the number of university patents in all estimations. From columns 1 to 3, we see 
that a one percent increase in R&D funds will increase the number of patents issued by 
universities more than 2% and the number of international patents by 6%. Via a Wald test, at 
5% significance level we reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of R&D for 
national and international patents are equal.  
Moreover, this is a higher ratio than in previous results by Payne and Siow [41] and Coupé 
[17], where the increase of patents was not higher than 1%. The explanation may lie in the 
fact that they use only public funding rather than all funding. However, Azagra et al. ([3], [4]) 
also use all funding but find lower elasticity for R&D funds. A second explanation may be, 
then, the unit of observation. Adams and Griliches [1] find that research output follows 
diminishing returns to scale at the individual level but constant returns at the aggregate level. 
We treat our sample data at an even higher level of aggregation. 
The data do not confirm Hypothesis 2, so the number of university researchers does not 
seem to influence the number of patents issued in Spain. 
The data give evidence to support Hypothesis 3 only in the case of natpat. We find the 
time trend significant, as in Azagra et al. ([3], [4]) and Coupé [17], meaning that there are 
exogenous factors not included in the present model, which produce only more national 
applications, i.e. probably lower quality patents. Henderson et al. [31] and Mowery and 
                                                 
10 Note that for the estimations we took non-proportion variables (herd, fte, pop) in logs (lherd, lfte, 
lpop). 
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Ziedonis [36] find somewhat similar results in the US case, regarding the declining quality of 
university patents. 
 
 
1 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
2 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
3 
Negative 
Binomial 
Regression 
4 
Binomial 
Probit Model 
5 
Least 
Squares 
with Group 
Dummy 
Variables       
Dependent 
variable  Natpat Natgrant Intpat Intpat2 Lpub 
Number of 
observations 238 238 238 238 238 
Log likelihood 
function  -509.28 -508.17 -133.18 -79.99 222.00 
Prob[χ2>value]  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.84 0.76 0.52 0.84 0.97 
      
 Coeff. (t-tatio) Coeff. (t-tatio) Coeff. (t-tatio) Coeff. (t-tatio) Coeff. (t-tatio) 
Constant -179.25 (-6.07) -9.24 (-13.75) -5.89 (-1.38) -1.35 (-0.51)  
Lherd 2.33 (17.02) 2.38 (16) 6.01 (4.52) 3.66 (4.52)  
Lfte     0.16 (8) 
Trend 0.09 (5.75)    0.04 (16.72) 
Ppol 1.11 (1.79)  0.02 (0.01) 1.1 (0.78) -0.15 (-0.95) 
Ppriv -0.57 (-2.1)  -2.39 (-2.31) -1.76 (-2.5) -0.25 (-2.52) 
Lpop   -3.51 (-2.44) -2.49 (-2.82)  
α 0.27 (4.66) 0.58 (5.96) 1.32 (2.65)   
Table 3. Estimation of Spanish university patent and publication production functions 
T-ratios in parenthesis. R2 is the Poisson-associated model R2 for the Negative Binomial Regression 
and the count R2 for the Binomial Probit Model 
The data partially support Hypothesis 4, i.e. university structure influences the production 
of national university patents. Age structure (univst2) is never jointly significant. Other 
characteristics (univst1) are sometimes significant. A higher proportion of polytechnic 
universities will involve a (weak) increase of national applications, but not of any other kind of 
patents. A higher proportion of private universities will lead the region to apply less often for 
every kind of patents. 
The data do not support Hypothesis 5 – joint research structure does not influence the 
production of university patents.11 
If we now look into Column 5, referred to university publications, we can see that there is 
conflicting evidence to support Hypothesis 6. We would reject it because R&D should have a 
significant effect on publications as on patents, but it does not, and because the opposite 
occurs with the number of researchers. We would accept the hypothesis because university 
structure and the trend are influential, pointing in the same direction as the effect on patents: 
over time, the number of publications increases, whereas a higher proportion of private 
universities will make it decrease. Moreover, the proportion of joint research centers has no 
significant effect, as on patents. In any case, what comes out of the analysis is that there are 
                                                 
11 We tried to discount joint centres in social sciences and humanities from our measure. It did not 
change the results. 
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no inputs with significant effects and different signs on publications and patents, so it is 
compatible for regions to produce both. 
5. Conclusions 
Three main interests guided this research: Do we confirm the relation between university 
patents and research productivity at regional level? If so, do regions have any scope to 
influence the generation of university patents through their academic structure? In addition, 
do the same forces drive university patents and publications? 
According to our results, university patents are an expression of R&D efforts also when we 
focus on the region, and patent applications are an indicator of how regions organize their 
university structure. Therefore, if there is a re-composition of academic R&D favouring 
patentable results, regions can control their university structure to compensate for it, e.g. 
hindering the proportion of polytechnic universities and favouring the proportion of private 
universities12. 
However, the former will have no effect on university publications while the latter will also 
decrease the probability of generating these publications. Besides, no option guarantees 
some bearing on national patent grants. Consequently, the scope of changes in university 
structure is very limited. In Spain, the reason may be that regional governments have created 
recent universities in order to attend for increases in population and students after economic 
buoyancy, rather than as a deliberate attempt to improve local scientific and technological 
production. 
In the same sense, we are concerned with the non-confirmation that a stronger presence 
of joint research centres may increase the probability of generating patents and publications 
at universities. If our results are certain, a possible explanation may lie in a too high 
proportion of university professors in their staff and a too low share of CSIC researchers, with 
the consequent heavy teaching load. We recall that joint research centres may be still useful 
to produce other benefits at regional level, e.g. scientific networks, contracts, spin-off firms, 
etc.  
More possibilities arise if we think that while university patents are more reactive to 
expenditure on R&D at regional level, university publications are more responsive to the 
number of researchers, i.e. financial capital is more important for the former, human capital 
for the latter. It means that sustained promotion of both will make it compatible for regions 
their joint production. 
It also implies that standing out in the generation of both outputs requires costly investment 
in many inputs. The sacrifice is relevant for an efficient working of a regional innovation 
system, since universities may be able to interact with several types of local firms –those 
interested in direct technological potentialities, mainly embedded in patents, and those able 
to absorb broader scientific knowledge with riskier but more creative application, mainly 
related to publications. 
We must mention some limitations in our econometric models. We prevented endogeneity 
to some extent by lagging all the independent variables one period, but the problem may still 
exist if older patents are an input for some of them. We could reduce it by trying with longer 
lags, but then we would lose some observations. In addition, we did not test for spatial 
autocorrelation. However, the negative binomial and zero inflated models that we use take 
                                                 
12 In a related article we found that if we included variables to measure the motivation to catch-up with 
the technological competencies of other institutions in the region, the university structure effect loses 
its significance (Azagra et al., [5]). We interpret it as a sign that this motivation to catch-up is specially 
present at polytechnics, whereas it is scarce in private universities. 
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into account heterogeneity among regions, so this and the inclusion of population size as a 
determinant should reduce the problem. 
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